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Collective bargaining on working hours has increasingly been decentralised in Denmark, leading to 
a large number of agreements on flexible working hours at company level. Recent case studies 
suggest that these agree ments have i mproved the productivity of companies and the work-life bal-
ance for employees. However, although Den mark offers a best case scenario of organised decen-
tralisation, certain groups of e mployees and companies seem less well covered by the agree-
ments. Drawing on a comprehensive survey in the Danish industrial sector from 2008 this paper
exa mines whether or not these trends can be confirmed with regards to co mpany level agreements 
on flexitime. The paper concludes that the decentralisation on working hours in the Danish indus-
trial sector has contributed to a broad and predominately even spread of flexitime agreements with 
a nu mber of beneficial effects for both e mployees and companies. How ever, some challenges still 
remain with regards to those e mployees who are not covered by the agreements.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Over the last decades employers have pushed for decentralisation of collective bargaining to in-
crease flexibility and competitiveness at company level (Katz 1993). Parallel to this development 
employees have increasingly been asking for more flexibility at work to balance their work and fam-
ily life (Bosch 2004). However, it is heavily debated whether or not these developments are com-
patible. On the one hand, decentralisation enables a close adjustment of working hours not only to 
company needs but also to the needs of employees; on the other hand, a precondition to this is
suffi cient bargaining power for both sides of industry at the local level. In countries characterised 
by disorganised decentralisation l i ke the US, low union densities and poor coverage of collective 
agreements makes if difficult for employees to articulate their needs (Traxler 1995). However, also 
in countries characterised by organised decentralisation such as Germany, it is disputed whether 
or not collective agreements at company level ensure a reconciliation of employer and employee 
needs for flexibility (Seifert 2003). 
This paper addresses the question whether decentralisation of collective bargaining can be an in -
strument to improve the work-life balance for employees and the productivity for companies by 
examining the consequences of decentralisation on working hours in Denmark. Denmark offers an 
interesting institutional setting, as it upholds a  very high union density combined with a high cover-
age of collective agreements and high presence of employee representatives with bargaining com-
petencies. Today, union density in Denmark is close to a level where eight in ten wage earners are 
organised, and eight in ten are covered by collective agreements (Ilsøe et al. 2007). Furthermore, 
a recent phone survey in the industrial sector concludes that almost eight in ten companies cov-
ered by a collective agreement have employee representatives with competencies to conclude
agreements with the local management (Ilsøe 2008a). Even among small companies (20-49 em-
ployees) a relatively high proportion (six out of ten companies) reports having employee represen-
tatives. In other words, Denmark form s a critical case (in this example a best case scenario) on 
employee representation, which allows us to generalise negative results of the Danish case to less 
fortunate cases (Flyvbjerg 1996). Does the organised decentralisation of Denmark indeed facilitate
integrative bargaining (wi n-wi n situations) on working time flexibility at company level, i.e. agree-
ments on flexible hours that meet both the interests of employers and employees (Walton & 
McKersie 1965)? If this not the case (or only to a limited extent) in Denmark, we can expect similar 
findings in less organised settings.
The study is based on a large survey on company level bargaining on flexible working hours con-
ducted in the Danish industrial sector. The survey aimed at testing a number of hypotheses devel-
oped in a series of case studies performed in the industrial sector in 2005/2006 which included 
explorative interviews with managers and employee representatives at five companies with agree-
ments on flexible working hours (Ilsøe 2006). Many hypotheses were drawn from the indicative 
conclusions of the case studies and tested in the survey. However, we will in this paper only exam-
ine three of those. 
1. All companies participating in the case studies had signed written agreements on working 
hours that entailed significant improvements of the flexibility needed by the company and 
the flexibility asked for by employees (i.e. win-win situations). The first hypothesis is there-
fore, that many companies in the industrial sector will have signed working time agree-
ments with beneficial effects for both sides of industry. 
2. According to some employee representatives interviewed in the case studies, smaller com-
panies less often signed agreements on flexible working hours than larger companies. The 
second hypothesis is therefore that agreements on flexible working hours are unevenly di s-
tributed among companies of different size.  
3. It appeared to be a challenge in more than one of the case companies to cover the needs 
of those employees that differed from the majority. Certain groups of employees seemed 
less well covered by agreements on flexible working hours, as they were unable to offer the 
flexibility asked for (older workers, lone parents etc.). Therefore the third hypothesis is that 
the benefits of flexible working hours obtained by both sides of industry are unevenly dis-
tributed among employees as well. 
To limit the scope of analysis, the paper will focus on company level agreements on flexitime only. 
Flexitime – or flextime or comp time – is a flexible working time arrangement that (within certain 
limits) allow employees to vary their start and fini shing time of work. It is often implemented via 
personal time accounts, where employees can save up surplus hours and later spend them as time 
off in lieu. Flexitime usually implies an increase in employee influence on the daily working hours 
and is often mentioned as an instrument to improve on employees’ work life balances (Golden
2001; Fagan et al. 2001, Presser 2006; Deding et al. 2006). The introduction of flexitime agree-
ments is therefore potentially beneficial not only to management, but also  to employees. 
The paper is structured in the following way. First, it gives a brief introduction to the decentralisa-
tion process on working hours in the Danish industrial sector. Second, the methodology of the sur-
vey is described. Third, relevant results of the survey are presented and analysed, i.e. the distribu-
tion and effects of company level agreements on flexitime. The impacts of the results are di s-
cussed in the concluding section.
DECENTRALISATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON FLEXIBLE WORKING HOURS IN 
THE DANISH INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
The manufacturing industry in Denmark represented by The Central Organization of Industrial Em-
ployees in Denmark (CO-industri) on the employee side and The Confederation of Danish Industry 
(DI) on the employer side i s not only the trend setting sector in collective bargaining in Denmark it 
al so has the longest history of decentralisation on working hours (Due et al. 1994). Within this sec-
tor social partners at sector level started turning their attention to the benefits of varying the distri-
bution of working hours (i.e. annualised hours and flexitime) already in the 1970s. Untill the 1970s
the primary focus in sector level bargaining on working hours had been on determining the length 
of the work week (weekly working hours, overtime etc.) and on the managerial prerogative to vary
the scheduling of hours (shift work, Saturday/Sunday work etc.) (Seifert 2005; Marginson & Sisson 
2004).  The possibility to negotiate flexitime at company level was mentioned for the first time in the 
1979 Industrial agreement. Hence, a separate opening clause on flexitime was first introduced in
the 1990s (Navrbjerg et al. 2001). During this period (1970s – 1990s) opening clauses on annual -
ised hours were introduced as well. However, company-level bargaining on flexible working hours 
al so existed long before the fi rst opening clause on working hours was introduced to the sector 
level agreement. Indeed, decentralisation within this area of collective bargaining can be inter-
preted as a response to earlier developments at company level, where an increasing number of 
closet agreements (i.e. agreements more or less hidden from the sector-level partners) and local 
practices on working time deviated from the sector-level agreement (Navrbjerg et al. 2001).
In 2000, the so-called Pilot Scheme was introduced. This opening clause increased the scope for 
company-level bargaining dramatically by allowing management and employee representatives to 
ignore up to four chapters of the sector level agreement, including the chapter on working hours, if 
they concluded company agreements on these issues. In 2004, the scheme was made a perma-
nent part of the sector level agreement, and an introductory demand to seek approval from the 
sector-level partners when using the scheme was removed. At the same time, a new option clause 
was added to the Industrial Agreement offering the possibility of concluding local framework 
agreements for individual bargaining on working hours. The use of the Pilot Scheme, however, 
remains somewhat limited, as statistics from social partners show that only 46 agreements using 
the scheme (mostly on working hours) had been concluded by 2006.1 The limited use might be a 
consequence of the wide range of possibilities for concluding company level agreements on flexi-
ble working hours already present in the sector level agreement.
METHODS
The empi rical analysis draws on the results from a comprehensive web survey conducted in Janu-
ary 2008 with 226 randomly selected production companies with 20 employee or more in the Dan-
ish industrial sector. Companies were selected from a pool of companies covered by the Industrial 
Agreement and which had one or more employee representatives present as these are necessary 
preconditions to conclude agreements at company level. The survey included questions on com-
pany size, collective bargaining on working hours for employees in production, coverage of em-
ployees, and on implementation and effects of working time agreements. T wo separate versions of 
the questionnaire was made, as the survey was directed to both management and employee rep-
resentatives at each company. However, as many questions as possible were kept identical to be 
able to compare their answers. The survey was sent to managers and employee representatives 
that were bargaining company level agreements for the largest groups of employees in production.
The response rate was somewhat lower on the management side (39,3 percent) than on the em-
ployee side (52,4 percent). A total of 145 managers and 151 employee representatives completed 
                                                
1 The figure was given to us in an interview  with representatives from DI and CO-i ndustri in spring 2006.
the questionnaire of which 70 came from the same companies. The survey therefore gave voice to 
the situation at 226 different companies. As the response rate was lower on the management side 
we analysed the sample to see if there were any significant differences in the composition of the 
non responding group and the responding group with regards to sex, age, company size or geo-
graphy. Fortunately, we did not find any significant differences that could question the general re-
presentativity of the survey. This was al so true for the employee representati ves. The first general 
analysis of the survey results showed that management and employee representatives often gave 
quite similar answers to the same questions. This suggests a high validity of the questions asked. 
Both managers and employee representatives participating in the survey had been actively in-
volved in company level bargaining for an average of eight years. They had therefore a solid ex-
perience on the subject we were asking to.
DISTRIBUTION AND EFFECTS OF FLEXITIME AGREEMENTS
The general results of the survey showed that most companies sampled had used of the opportu-
nity to bargain company level agreements on working time. In fact, only 14 percent of the compa-
nies had not concluded any worki ng time agreements. Approximately two thirds of the companies 
had actually closed more than one agreement, while one in five had concluded a single agreement.
Flexitime agreements turned out to be one of the two most common types of agreements found
and were only matched in figures by agreements on shift work (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Company level agreements on working hours
Source: (Ilsøe, forthcoming). 
Managers and employee representatives agreed that flexitime agreements where found in ap-
proximately four out of ten companies, whereas one in three managers and one in two employee 
representatives reported a shift work agreement present. The survey did not reveal any significant 
difference in the distribution of flexitime agreements across company size, as flexitime agreements 
seemed to be concluded with the same frequency in both smaller and larger companies (see Table 
2). 
Managers Employee 
representatives
Flexitime 43 40
Shift work 35 49
Saturday/Sunday work 26 30
Staggered hours 28 26
Compressed work weeks 19 30
12-hour shifts 18 24
Annualised hours 22 13
Phased retirement 10 19
No agreements 14 14
Increased weekly working hours 10 10
Parttime 11 9
Frame work agreement for individual 
bargaining on working hours
8 7
Other 5 9
Table 2: Flexitime agreements and company size
Managers Employee 
Representativ es  
Flexitime 
yes
Flexitime
no
Flexitime 
y es
Flexitime 
no
Small (20-49 employees) 41 59 48 52
Medium (50-149 employees) 39 61 33 67
Large (150- employees) 48 52 43 57
Source: (Ilsøe, forthcoming). M : γ=0,110, p=0,425; ER:  γ=0,013, p=0,929
Positive effects and time sovereignty                                                                                          
The high number of flexitime agreements allowed us to analyse the implementation and the effects 
of the agreements more closely. Companies with (one or more) agreements on working hours 
were in the survey asked which positive and negative effects they had observed of their agree-
ments. However, as many companies turned out to have more than one agreement on working 
time, their answers on effects could reflect on different agreements. Therefore the strategy of 
analysis was to compare effects reported by companies with agreements on flexitime and effects 
reported by companies without specific agreements on flexitime (but with other forms of working 
time agreements). 
Flexitime agreements showed to have a number of positive effects (see Table 3). We will here pri-
marily focus on the significant increases confirmed by both managers and employee representa-
tives. Three out of four managers with flexitime agreements reported an increase in motivation 
among employees, whilst only half of managers from companies without flexitime agreements re-
ported this. Twice as many employee representatives with flexitime agreements (61 percent) as 
employee representatives without (30 percent) would report an increase in motivation. 
Table 3: Positive effects of agreements on w orking hours 
Managers 
(n=125)
Employee 
Representativ es (n=128) 
Flexitime 
yes
Flexitime
no
Flexitime 
y es
Flexitime
no
Increased motivation* 73 48 61 30
Easier recruitmentº 60 26 39 13
Increased productivity ¹ 48 53 48 48
Improved work-lif e balance² 43 24 54 24
Improved social inclusion³ 32 6 33 10
Source: (Ilsøe, forthcoming). *M: γ=0,485, p=0,004; ER: γ=0,056, p=0,000; ºM: γ=0,628, p=0,000; ER: γ=0,614, p=0,001 ; ¹M: γ= -0,112, 
p=0,530; ER: γ=  -0,004, p=0,980; ²M: γ=0,403, p=0,024; ER: γ=0,580, p=0,000; ³M: γ=0,742, p=0,000; ER: γ=0,614, p=0,002.
Flexitime agreements also appeared to ease the recruitment of new employees. Six out of ten 
managers with flexitime reported thi s effect compared to one in four without flexitime. Likewise four 
out of ten employee representatives with flexitime reported about easier recruitment – this was 
three times as many as those without flexitime. Further, flexitime agreements seem to improve on 
productivity with same high frequency as other agreements (approximately 50 percent). Turning to 
the effects on work-life balances flexitime agreements seemed to double the chance that work-life 
balances would be improved. Flexitime agreements al so seemed to increase the social inclusion of 
employees with special needs or less temporary problems. In fact, the agreements tripled the like-
lihood of experiencing an improved social inclusion.
The empi rical findings suggest that flexitime agreements have positive effects in many companies 
and they appear beneficial not only to managers (increased motivation, easier recruitment and 
increased productivity) but also to employees (work-life balance and social inclusion). Flexitime 
agreements indeed make it possible for companies to combine an increase in producti vity with 
improvements in employees’ work-life balances. However, the large number of positive effects 
suggests that the outcomes of company level agreements on flexitime are more complex constella-
tions than the focus on productivity and work-life balance signifies. In fact, a series of win-win out-
comes can be obtained by introducing flexitime agreements. Moreover, the positive effects are 
likely to support each other blurring the boundaries between outcomes that are beneficial to man-
agers and to employees. Flexitime might contribute to an improved social inclusion because it 
eases employees’ work life balance. Employees with challenging family lives or other responsibili-
ties outside work can for instance more easily continue in paid work if they are able to organise 
their working hours with consi deration to their commitments outside work (Larsen 2005; Philips et 
al. 2002). Also an increased motivation among employees and easier recruitment may be closely 
related to an improvement in the work-life balance. It might be more attractive to work at a com-
pany where a reconciliation of work and family life in fact i s possible than else where. Employees 
might also be more encouraged to consider company needs in their working time planning, if they 
know they can consider family commitments when needed.
The examples presented suggest that the work-life balance of employees i s the nexus for many of 
the positive effects of flexitime agreements. However, it is questionable if flexitime always causes
such a significant improvement in employees’ work life balances. A crucial factor in flexitime and its 
potential to improve on employees’ work life balance is the degree to which employees are allowed 
to manage their working time accounts them selves. If employees are not gained any time sover-
eignty it is difficult for them to adjust their working hours to family needs with a short notice. Con-
versely, if they are allowed to administer their accounts on their own, they can create a working 
schedule that fits the needs and wishes at work and at home. Case studies have showed that there 
can be many dimensions to this employee influence (Il søe 2006). In practice, working time ac-
counts are not only used to vary the start and finishing times of work, but also to schedule working 
days, whole days off and longer periods of leave (vacation).
The survey included questions to these four dimensions of time sovereignty. An analysis of the 
answers showed that flexitime agreements did mean a significant increase in employee influence 
on two of these dimensions. Whilst one in four manager and employee representative without flexi-
time agreements reported a high employee influence on the daily start and finishing times of work, 
thi s figure rose to six out of ten for those with flexitime agreements (see Table 4). According to the 
answers from the employee representatives, it also meant a significant increase in employee influ-
ence on which days they should work (Table 5). 
Table 4: Employee influence on the daily start and finishing times of work
Managers Employee 
Representativ es  
Flexitime 
yes
Flexitime 
no
Flexitime 
y es
Flexitime 
no
High 60 27 57 23
Medium 22 27 23 38
Low 18 46 20 39
Source: (Ilsøe, forthcoming). M: γ= - 0,560, p=0,000; ER: γ= -0,506, p=0,000
Table 5: Employee influence on which days they should work
Managers Employee 
Representativ es  
Flexitime 
yes
Flexitime 
no
Flexitime 
y es
Flexitime 
no
High 25 15 38 16
Medium 33 32 25 38
Low 41 54 38 45
Source: (Ilsøe, forthcoming). M: γ= - 0,245, p=0,079; ER: γ= -0,308, p=0,000
The high levels of influence on these two dimensions of working hours may explain the number of 
positive effects of the flexitime agreements. Increased employee influence on the start and finish-
ing times of work as well as on which days to work might not only ease employees’ work-life bal-
ance. Other aspects that are affected by work-life balance improvements may also improve. Flexi-
time agreements did, however, not seem to contribute to a higher employee influence on the two 
remaining dimensions of time sovereignty: the scheduling of whole days off and the scheduling of 
vacation. This could be explained by the fact that most employees in the sampled companies –
regardless of any agreements on working time – seemed to have a high level of employee influ-
ence on these aspects. According to both managers and employee representatives, seven out of 
ten employees in industry had a high influence on the scheduling of their vacation and half of the 
employees had a high influence on scheduling of whole days off.
Negative effects and coverage of employees                                                                                                                                        
Most managers and employee representatives did not experience any negative effects regarding 
their working time agreements. This was both true for companies with and without agreements on 
flexitime (see Table 6). Only one type of negative effect was significantly more likely to be found in 
companies with flexitime agreements than in companies without. Six percent of managers with 
flexitime agreements reported more conflicts at the work place (among employees or between em-
ployees and management) compared to none of the managers without flexitime agreements. Six-
teen percent of employee representatives with flexitime experienced more conflicts compared to 
eight percent without flexitime2. How can this be? Does the implementation of flexitime agreements 
contain special hurdles?
                                                
2 This differ ence was, however, only statistically significant on a ten percent level.
Table 6: Negative effects of agreements on working hours 
Managers (n=125) Employee 
Representativ es (n=128) 
Flexitime 
yes
Flexitime 
no
Flexitime 
y es
Flexitime 
no
No negative effects 68 64 57 42
More conflicts* 6 0 16 8
*M: γ=1,000, p=0,039; ER: γ=0,417, p=0,119
Recent case studies might supply us with some possible answers to these questions. They
showed that it can be difficult for employees to administer their working time accounts themselves, 
as some employees tend to build up too large surpluses or deficits to be able to balance them out 
again on their own (Ilsøe 2006). T here were examples of lone mothers, who used the account to 
pick up children form day care early once a week, but over months would accumulate deficits they 
had no change to balance out. There were also examples of young men without family obligations,
who worked so many surplus hours that they would never be able to spend them all as time off in 
lieu. This often contributed to disagreements between management and employees. The large 
surpluses also created problems when a number of employees were fired, as employees with sur-
plus hours were not entitled to receive unemployment benefits. Neither the managers nor the em -
ployee representatives interviewed wished to reduce the high employee influence on time ac-
counts, as this was seen as profitable for both companies and employees. Instead, the solution 
often found was to introduce some quite narrow upper and lower limits on time accounts to control 
the development in hours. The results of the survey showed that approximately eight out of ten of 
the participating companies with flexitime agreements had agreed on an upper limit on the flexitime 
time accounts, and nearly all companies had agreed on lower limits. Only a sm all minority of com -
panies seemed to have implemented flexitime agreements without an upper or lower limit on time 
accounts and therefore to risk this type of workplace conflicts.
Another possible explanation for the increase in work place conflicts could be a less than full cov-
erage of employees at companies with agreements on flexitime. The web survey was designed in 
a way that offered the opportunity to add comments after most questions. Some managers took the 
advantage of this. Thei r comments suggest a close link between a less than full coverage of flexi-
time at the work place and a rise in workplace conflicts. They reported that the introduction of flexi-
time had caused disagreements among the employees as not all were covered. One manager
characterised the phenomena as ‘flexitime jealousy’, as employees in departments where flexitime 
for scheduling or organisational reasons could not be int roduced got upset by the fact that their 
colleagues in other departments worked flexitime. Indeed, conflicts on working time agreements 
are a common phenomenon,  and can build up severe cleavages between different groups of em -
ployees at the same work place. Other research has revealed examples of st rong conflicts be-
tween male and female employees (especially lone mothers) at a company that wanted to intro-
duce an increase in the weekly working hours for a longer period of time (Ilsøe 2006). Here, the 
conflict arose from the fact that not everybody wanted (or were able) to work the new schedules,
as they needed to fetch children at day care.  The employee representatives had focused on the 
needs and wishes of the majority of the employees in the bargaining process which left the minori-
ties with a risk of being squeezed. The comments in the survey suggest that flexitime can cause 
the reverse type of conflict – everybody wants them, but not everybody can get them. However, the 
figures from the survey reveal that flexitime agreements in most cases cover the majority or all 
employees in production (see Table 7). 
Table 7: Flexitime agreements - share of employees covered 
A majority or all Half A minority Don’t know
Managers (n=63) 87 3 10 0
Employee representat ives (n=61) 77 3 16 3
Source: (Ilsøe, forthcoming).
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The survey among 226 Danish companies covered by the Industrial Agreements shows that the 
opportunities to sign company level agreements on working hours are widely used. Only 14 per-
cent of companies have not concluded an agreement on working time. Agreements on flexitime are 
one of the most frequent agreements, as four in ten companies have concluded an agreement on 
thi s i ssue. Managers and employee representatives agree that these agreements have caused a 
variety of positive effects including increased productivity (for some companies) and improved 
work-life balances (for some employees). Among companies with (one or more) agreements on 
working time, the presence of a flexitime agreement doubles the chance for improved work-life 
balances. A number of other positive effects included increased worker motivation, easier recruit -
ment (for companies) and social inclusion (of employees). A possible explanation to these positive 
effects could be the increase in employee influence on the daily scheduling of working hours and 
on the choice of which days to work. It is therefore likely that most flexitime agreements form win-
win situations with multiple beneficial outcomes for management and employees. This confirms the 
first hypothesis that collective bargaining on flexible working hours (flexitime) at company level with 
win-win bargaining outcomes i s a widespread phenomenon in the Dani sh industry.
The second hypothesis on the uneven distribution of flexitime agreements across company size i s,  
however, not confirmed. The survey shows that the likelihood to conclude an agreement on flexi -
time is independent of company size. However, the third hypothesis on an uneven distribution of 
flexitime agreements across different groups of employees seems to be confirmed. Although flexi -
time agreements in most cases cover all or the majority of employees, they in some cases only 
cover a minority. According to some managers this can cause a form of ‘flexitime jealousy’ among 
those, who are not covered by such an agreement at the work place. This corresponds well with 
the general finding that flexitime agreements can cause a rise in work place conflicts. Other re-
search findings support this, as they show how disagreements on working time can result in severe 
cleavages between different groups of employees. T hese studies also suggest that conflicts might 
al so be due to a lack of upper and lower limits on working time accounts. However, the survey 
document that only few companies have no such limits, a problem that easily can be restored. In-
deed the findings raise the question what can be done for those employees in industry who for 
different reasons (such as the type of production, scheduling or work organisation needed) cannot 
work flexitime. Both for sake of these employees and their work-life balances and for the sake of 
preventing work place conflicts.
Shift work, which many managers and employee representatives comment upon in the survey as 
unpopular among employees, is still wide spread in the companies participating in the survey.
Case studies from the US suggest that a reorganisation of the shift work schedule to a compressed 
work week might improve employees’ work-life balances as they will have more days off during the 
week (Ilsøe 2008b). This is an attractive solution in the US context, where parents want to reduce 
day care fees, whereas it is questionable how it would work in a Danish context. One company
participating in the Danish case studies reported that they had moved young male employees from 
departments with compressed work weeks to other departments, when they had children, as they 
found it difficult to combine compressed work weeks and modern family life. However, the em-
ployee representative of this company also reported that the compressed work weeks were very 
attractive among other groups of employees, who enjoyed more days off in a row (for hobbies, 
summer house visits etc.). Further, it will be interesting to see the results of a recently launched 
research project in the public sector in Denmark entitled ‘Prioritized Working Time’. The project
seeks to uncover the effects of an increased employee influence on the scheduling of working days
for those employees who are working shifts (shift work, compressed work weeks, 12-hour shifts) 
and cannot work a flexitime schedule. 
It is fair to believe that the broad spread of flexitime agreements with win-win outcomes for man-
agement and employees (among both larger and smaller companies) rest on the fact that the de-
centralisation on working hours in the Danish industrial sector has been organi sed. Danish industry
is a highly organised sector with a high coverage of collective agreements and of employee repre-
sentatives – even among smaller companies. Many companies have the opportunity to sign com-
pany level agreements on working hours, as they meet the preconditions to do so (coverage of the 
Industrial Agreement and at least one employee representative present). Representatives from 
CO-industri have argued that especially the high coverage of employee representatives has been a 
decisive precondition for them, when agreeing on a decentralisation of bargaining competencies on 
working hours from the sector level to the company level 3. An elected employee representative can 
arti culate the needs and wishes of the employees and bargain local solutions with management 
that balance employee and company concerns. 
However, an organised decentralisation of working hours still face the problem s that can arise 
when introducing flexible working time arrangements and the survey suggests that the implementa-
tion of flexitime agreements can cause trouble at some workplaces. Due to different reasons it i s 
sometimes impossible to cover all employees when an agreement on flexitime is concluded. This 
can contribute to conflicts between those who are covered and those who are not, and as a result 
create cleavages between different groups of employees or disagreements between management 
and employees. These conflicts might question the position of the employee representative and 
affect the bargaining relations locally. As the collective bargaining system in the Danish industry is 
heavily decentralised, this is an important challenge where conflicts emerge. It can, however, al so 
be a crucial challenge in less organised sectors or in less organised countries, as flexitime is asked 
for by employees all over the world, and certain job functions by nature are more compatible with 
flexitime than others. Employee representatives in less organised settings might even be more 
affected by conflicts on flexitime than employee representatives in organised settings as their posi-
tion in company level bargaining and among employees can be more fragile.
                                                
3 This statement was made at an interview with a representative from CO-industri in 2005.
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